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In his essay on the role of the judiciary in corporate law, Professor
John C. Coffee, Jr. contends that the differences between the compet-
ing sides in the mandatory/enabling debate' in corporate governance
have been greatly overstated because both sides have ignored the im-
portant role of a central institutional actor, namely the judiciary. Ac-
cording to Professor Coffee, courts, using well-recognized techniques
to interpret statutes and intrafirm contracts, often will reconcile
whatever tension may exist between contractarians and anticontractari-
ans. Anticontractarians, according to Coffee, generally misperceive the
nature of corporate law because they fail to understand the extent to
which courts adjust the mandatory statutory provisions imposed by leg-
islatures. Contractarians, on the other hand, misperceive the nature of
corporate law because they fail to appreciate the role that courts play in
evaluating the contractual innovations suggested by the parties against
the backdrop of the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty owed by direc-
tors and managers to their shareholders.
I fully agree with Professor Coffee's basic premise, which is that the
central role played by courts must be understood before the concept of
* Professor of Law, Cornell University.
1. As used in Professor Coffee's article, The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Cor-
porate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1618 (1989), as well as in
this Comment, the phrase "mandatory/enabling debate" refers to the debate between
those who argue that the structure of American corporate law consists (or ought to con-
sist) of a series of mandatory rules, and those who argue that American corporate law
consists (or ought to consist) primarily of a series of default rules that serve as a stan-
dard form contract that the parties can modify easily by substituting their own contrac-
tual provisions. Professors Melvin Eisenberg and Victor Brudney are principal
exponents of the view that mandatory rules comprise the essential elements of corporate
law, see, e.g., M. Eisenberg, The Structure of the Corporation: A Legal Analysis
134-211 (1976); Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of
Contract, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1403 (1985), whilejudge Frank H. Easterbrook and Profes-
sor Daniel R. Fischel are principal exponents of the view that corporate law rules ought
to be enabling.
While they clearly take a more laissez faire attitude than Eisenberg and Brudney,
even Easterbrook and Fischel often have taken the position that corporate law rules
ought to be mandatory. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161, 1175, 1189, 1201
(1981) (arguing that firms ought not to be permitted to allow management to resist
hostile tender offers because of economic waste and free-rider problems); Easterbrook
& Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 Va. L. Rev. 669,
697-99 (1984) (arguing that the incentives of the private market are insufficient to cause
private firms to disclose to investors the optimal amount of information about them-
selves). In fact, there are no corporate law scholars who take the view that corporate law
rules should be strictly enabling.
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corporate governance can be evaluated or even categorized. On the
other hand, an adjustment must be made to Coffee's argument in order
to achieve the reconciliation he is attempting. When courts adjust the
mandatory rules imposed by legislatures, they employ a hypothetical
bargaining approach that first determines what arrangement the parties
themselves would have adopted ex ante and then requires that subse-
quent transactions conform to that hypothetical bargain. It is only in
this way that mandatory rules can properly be labelled "contractarian."
I find the implication of Professor Coffee's analysis quite profound. It
indicates that the only respectable academic approaches to corporate
law are those that accord judges the central, decisive role in American
corporate life. This is an implication well worth exploring.
I. THE ROLE OF THE COURTS
Professor Coffee invokes numerous examples from existing case
law to show that courts have a wide range of alternatives at their dispo-
sal when interpreting statutes that appear to be mandatory. 2 The im-
plication of his analysis is that courts play a central role in corporate
governance even when they appear to be merely interpreting statutes.
While Professor Coffee clearly is correct that the necessity of inter-
preting the statutes that govern the behavior of corporations forces the
legislatures that enact such statutes to share power with courts, it is not
at all obvious how this judicial power unites the competing views of the
contractarians and the anticontractarians. At first blush, the process
that Professor Coffee describes appears merely to substitute the
mandatory rules imposed by one institution (the legislature) with the
mandatory rules imposed by another, even less malleable institution
(the judiciary). After all, as Coffee recognizes, courts as well as legisla-
tures are capable of generating mandatory rules.3 Consequently, the
interpretive role played by courts may simply substitute one form of
mandatory rule for another and therefore have little, if anything, to do
with the mandatory/enabling debate. This last point seems particularly
true in light of the fact that there appears to be no reason to assume
that those who favor mandatory corporate law rules prefer that these
mandatory rules emanate from legislatures rather than courts. 4 After
all, as Coffee recognizes, 5 those who favor mandatory rules are con-
2. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 1, at 1628-36, 1644-47.
3. Indeed, Part IV of Coffee's article is devoted to the consideration of "when, if
ever, courts should make new mandatory rules." See id. at 1628.
4. In light of the responsiveness of legislatures to lobbying by corporate manage-
ment and the corporate bar, there may be good reason to prefer the corporate law rules
generated by judges over the rules generated by legislatures since judges generally are
somewhat more insulated from political pressures than are legislators. Cf. Romano, An-
swering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89
Colum. L. Rev. 1599, 1605 (1989) (legislative enactment often prompted by corporate
bar rather than shareholder interest).
5..See Coffee, supra note 1, at 1658.
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cerned about the substance of such rules and have not focused on the
process by which those rules are generated. They are interested in out-
comes.6 Accordingly, those who favor mandatory rules will prefer the
rules that reach the results they deem best, with little regard for
whether the rules emanate from the legislature or from the courts.
The point of all of this is not to say that Professor Coffee is wrong,
but to emphasize that his arguments are rather more subtle than they
may appear to be at first. Only by applying a contractarian perspective
to all corporate law rules-including mandatory rules-do courts rec-
oncile the tension between the enabling and the mandatory elements of
corporate law. By evaluating corporate conduct against an existing
background of legal norms, such as the fiduciary duties of care and loy-
alty, the mandatory rules that courts enforce constitute a sort of"meta-
contract" that is consistent with both the contractarian perspective of
an Easterbrook or a Fischel and the anticontractarian perspective of an
Eisenberg or a Brudney.
This meta-contract perspective is commonly known as the hypo-
thetical bargaining approach, and it requires courts to interpret vague
terms (whether in intrafirm charter provisions or in statutes) as being
identical to the provisions that the parties to the dispute would have
meant those terms to be if they were discussing the terms ex ante.7
However, Professor Coffee purports to reect the hypothetical bargain-
ing approach as being inconsistent with the traditional legal approach
under which corporate officers and directors are said to owe fiduciary
duties to shareholders that require them to exercise their powers only
to benefit the shareholders.8
Professor Coffee's rejection of the hypothetical bargaining ap-
proach is odd for two reasons. First, as noted above, the hypothetical
bargaining approach appears to be necessary in order to harmonize the
views of those who favor mandatory rules and those who favor enabling
rules. If courts are not engaged in a hypothetical bargaining approach,
all they are doing when applying traditional fiduciary duty analysis is
enforcing an alternative series of mandatory rules. Enforcement of
such mandatory rules by courts is not only impossible to reconcile with
the contractarian perspective, but difficult to condone on legitimacy
grounds, since courts should not substitute their own judgment for that
of the legislature absent a clear constitutional predicate for so doing.
Professor Coffee's rejection of the hypothetical bargaining ap-
proach is also odd because it is not clear that there is a difference between
6. See M. Eisenberg, supra note 1 (the core of corporate law, including fiduciary
duties, consists of mandatory rules which can only be defended on the basis of the sub-
stantive outcomes they generate).
7. In the case of a charter amendment, ex ante denotes the time the charter provi-
sion was adopted. In the case of a statute, ex ante denotes the time shares were sold to
the public.
8. Coffee, supra note 1, at 1679-80.
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the hypothetical bargaining approach and its purported rival, the tradi-
tional approach. The better argument seems to be that the approaches
are the same. The hypothetical bargaining approach is simply a more
formal restatement of traditional fiduciary duty analysis. Both ap-
proaches require judges to evaluate corporate actions in order to deter-
mine whether the actions enhance shareholder welfare.
Professor Coffee describes the hypothetical bargaining approach
as a "rival" of the traditional approach,9 although he concedes that the
approaches "will often produce the same result."' 0 Indeed, it is impos-
sible to imagine a situation in which the results would be different.
Both approaches instruct courts to view corporate transactions from
the shareholders' perspective. Indeed, the hypothetical bargaining ap-
proach can be viewed as a more precise formulation of the fiduciary
duty approach because it seeks to provide some measure of guidance to
courts about how to think about shareholder welfare and is explicit
about the fact that the shareholders' perspective ought to dominate ju-
dicial evaluation of corporate conduct.
Professor Coffee's real objection to the hypothetical bargaining ap-
proach appears to be that it is more indeterminate than fiduciary analy-
sis because it "invites the court to engage in an extraordinary range of
judicial speculations about what maximizes shareholder value."" I
agree with Coffee's general observation that the hypothetical bargain-
ing approach often yields results that appear indeterminate. But this
indeterminacy does not distinguish the hypothetical bargaining ap-
proach from the fiduciary duty approach, because the latter is equally
indeterminate.1 2 Part II of this Comment uses Coffee's observations to
show why this inevitably will be the case, and argues that this indetermi-
nacy is a source of strength rather than of weakness.
9. Id. at 1679.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Professor Coffee claims that the traditional fiduciary duty analysis is more clear
than the hypothetical bargaining approach because "the normal default rules of fiduci-
ary duty would generally govern unless the parties have clearly opted out by a valid char-
ter provision." Id. at 1679-80. But the hypothetical bargainers would wholeheartedly
agree that parties should not be allowed to cast off their fiduciary duties so easily.
Rather, the hypothetical bargainers would say that the fiduciary duties of officers and
directors require them to maximize aggregate shareholder wealth. See, e.g., Easter-
brook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 Yale LJ. 698, 702-03 (1982).
And, like Coffee, the hypothetical bargainers would not permit officers and directors to
avoid this fiduciary duty/hypothetical bargain without a clear expression from the par-
ties that they intended to do so. The hypothetical bargainers might eveh agree with
Professor Coffee that all of the burdens of proof, persuasion and production, should be
against those arguing for opting out.
Indeed, the unity between Coffee's approach and that of the hypothetical bargainers
is manifest in the very language Professor Coffee uses to describe the mandatory ap-
proach. He invokes standard contract rhetoric to describe an approach that is supposed
to be noncontractarian in nature. For example, when Coffee describes the fiduciary
standards as "the normal default rules of fiduciary duty" which will apply unless the
1989] 1695
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Professor Coffee's false dichotomy between the perspective of the
hypothetical bargainers and that of those who embrace the fiduciary
duty approach leads him erroneously to conclude that contractarians
fail to appreciate the role that courts play in evaluating the contractual
innovations suggested by the parties to the corporate contract. Once it
is seen that there is no distinction between the role envisioned for
courts by those who embrace a contractarian perspective and those who
embrace a fiduciary duty perspective, it becomes clear that courts have
a major role to play in evaluating the terms of the implicit contracts that
comprise the modem corporation.
II. THE POLICYMAKER'S DILEMMA AND THE FUTILITY OF
NONTRANSACTION-BASED CORPORATE LAw RULES
Imbedded in Professor Coffee's article is the notion that courts
rather than legislatures must assume the dominant role in corporate
governance, but he does not explain why this is the case. The explana-
tion is inextricably linked to the problem of indeterminacy identified
above and is grounded in the phenomenon known as the "poli-
cymaker's dilemma."' 3 If Coffee is correct that the differences between
the advocates of mandatory rules and those of enabling rules are more
apparent than real, the focus of the debate shifts to whether it is possi-
ble to develop generalized nontransaction-based corporate law rules that
enhance shareholder welfare.
The point becomes clear when we look at Professor Coffee's obser-
vations about poison pills. In explaining the role played by courts in
parties have "clearly opted out," Coffee, supra note 1, at 1679-80, it is hard to avoid the
conclusion that it is about contracts (albeit hypothetical ones) that he is speaking.
Jordan v. Duff& Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 108 S.
Ct. 1067 (1988), is the sole case Professor Coffee uses to illustrate his argument that the
hypothetical bargain approach is indeterminate. See Coffee, supra note 1, at 1680-81.
The issue in that case was whether a buy-sell agreement requiring an employee to sell
his stock back to the corporation at book value "for any reason including resignation,
discharge, death, disability or retirement" would force a corporation to disclose, inter
alia, ongoing negotiations with a potential merger partner, or a decision by the firm's
board of directors to "shop the firm" to potential bidders. Jordan, 815 F.2d at 432-33.
The hypothetical bargainers, Judges Frank Easterbrook and Richard Posner, dis-
agreed about the correct result. Judge Easterbrook, writing for the majority, held that
prior precedent required close corporations to disclose impending merger negotiations.
Id. at 434. He saw the case as turning on the applicability of SEC Rule lOb-5 to the
merger of a closely held corporation. Id. Judge Posner saw the case as turning on the
proper interpretation of the plaintiff's employment contract. Id. at 445-52 (Posner, J.,
dissenting).
In other words, this case did not turn on an interpretation of the fiduciary duties
owed to the plaintiff under general corporate law. Thus, the case does not support
Coffee's argument that the hypothetical bargaining approach is more indeterminate
than the fiduciary duty approach. It supports the proposition that the law of Rule lOb-5
is murky when securities transactions are consummated with employees.
13. Macey, Takeover Defense Tactics and Legal Scholarship: Market Forces Versus
the Policymaker's Dilemma, 96 Yale LJ. 342, 351 (1986).
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construing implicit corporate contracts, Professor Coffee observes that
the pill "provides a paradigm of a novel contractual provision that can
arguably be used either to maximize shareholder wealth or to entrench
existing management."' 14 But to understand the central role of the
courts in corporate governance, we first must recognize that this obser-
vation is not confined to poison pills. In fact, it applies to virtually
every device, scheme or transaction available to corporate decision
makers, from greenmail and poison pills, which do not appear benign,
to staggered terms for boards members, dividend payments to share-
holders and the issuance of new shares of stock, which do appear
benign.
The dilemma is that policymakers cannot benefit shareholders by
developing rules that successfully regulate whole classes of corporate
transactions. This has profound implications for our understanding of
corporate governance. Unlike legislatures, courts can respond to the
phenomenon on a case-by-case basis by upholding the validity of con-
sensual provisions in certain cases but not in others. For example, as
Coffee points out,15 in Petty v. Penntech Papers, Inc. 16 a Delaware court
held that a charter provision providing that a corporation could redeem
the whole or any part of its Series A preferred stock was limited by
Delaware's fiduciary rules that deny corporate management the right to
use corporate funds to entrench themselves in office.1 7 This result was
obtained despite the fact that redemption clearly was authorized under
the laws of Delaware and the charter of the corporation.' 8
Similarly, in Katzowitz v. Sidler,19 the New York Court of Appeals
refused to permit a group of directors to issue new stock because no
business purpose existed for the issuance, and the issuance was done in
such a way as to violate the fiduciary duty owed by directors to minority
shareholders in a close corporation. 20 The court reached this result
despite the fact that issuing additional shares of stock was clearly per-
missible under applicable state law and that the minority shareholder
was given the opportunity to retain his proportionate interest in the
firm by exercising his preemptive right.2 1
These examples demonstrate that seemingly benign transactions
can disadvantage shareholders just as transactions that apparently ex-
ploit shareholders can enhance their welfare. Because harm to share-
holders results not from particular types of transactions, but rather
from the circumstances in which the transactions are employed, rules
14. Coffee, supra note 1, at 1653.
15. Id. at 1641.
16. 347 A.2d 140 (Del. Ch. 1975).
17. Id. at 142-43.
18. Id. at 141.
19. 24 N.Y.2d 512, 249 N.E.2d 359, 301 N.Y.S.2d 470 (1969).
20. Id. at 519-20, 249 N.E.2d at 364, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 476-77.
21. Id. at 516, 249 N.E.2d at 362, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 474.
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that purport to govern classes of transactions are both underinclusive
and overinclusive. Such rules are underinclusive because they inevita-
bly validate corporate conduct that is detrimental to shareholder wel-
fare. They are overinclusive to the extent that they are viewed as
mandatory and thus prohibitive of transactions that would conflict with
the rules yet increase shareholder wealth.
The policymaker's dilemma leads inevitably to the conclusion that
even well-meaning legislatures often will be unable to generate wealth-
increasing responses to problems in corporate governance. The cor-
rect response often will require case by case analysis because of the
necessity for close attention to specific fact patterns. Needless to say,
those who take the position that corporate law rules ought to be a series
of mandatory rules with inflexible directives to corporations and to
courts do not appreciate the policymaker's dilemma.
While Professor Coffee appears to recognize the policymaker's di-
lemma, at least as it relates to the poison pill, it is not clear how the
standard he suggests for determining when courts should permit opt-
ing out of statutes or fiduciary duties represents an improvement over
the hypothetical bargaining approach he claims to reject. First, his re-
quirement that a provision should be upheld only if it does not "con-
flict with the clear purpose of any statutory provision or with an
established public policy intended to protect persons or interests other
than shareholders" 22 is too vague to provide any guidance. Nor does it
adequately take into account the public choice perspective, namely, that
both public and private entities that generate legal rules often promul-
gate rules that transfer wealth rather than create it.23
Second, his requirement that a provision be either "sufficiently
specific and limited in its application that the parties could appreciate
its likely impact at the time they approved it," or amount "to a substitu-
tion of an adequate alternative procedure that the parties could reason-
ably believe would better serve their interests, ' 24 does not recognize
that parties who wish to extricate themselves from the force of existing
legal norms may not have a good alternative at the time of contracting.
In such situations, the parties want to give courts flexibility to try a new
solution in light of the fact that they view the existing procedure to be
inadequate. Put another way, it is surprising that Professor Coffee ad-
vocates specific and limited rules. General and seemingly open-ended
provisions may well be better than specific provisions because general
provisions enable courts to provide remedies that fit particular circum-
stances. It seems incongruous for Coffee to celebrate the role of the
courts and yet simultaneously prefer rules that constrain their ability to
involve themselves in corporate governance.
22. Coffee, supra note 1, at 1665.
23. See Macey & Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate
Law, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 469, 498-509 (1987).
24. Coffee, supra note I, at 1665.
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The argument that there is not even a tiny bit of sunlight separat-
ing Professor Coffee's position from the hypothetical bargaining ap-
proach seems proven by Coffee's admonition that courts look at a
provision adopted by charter amendment to determine whether the
parties could have reasonably believed it would better serve their inter-
ests.25 This legal standard is nothing less than a precise restatement of
the hypothetical bargaining approach.
Finally, Professor Coffee advocates that provisions adopted by
charter amendment must be approved by a disinterested majority of the
shareholders under circumstances in which rejection of the amendment
would not cause them to be worse off than they were prior to the pro-
posal of the amendment.2 6 This requirement is strange in light of the
fact that some of the most nefarious examples of wealth-reducing trans-
actions occur without a shareholder vote. It is doubtful that sharehold-
ers would benefit from the canonization of a rule that would provide
even greater incentive to accomplish changes through methods that do
not require a shareholder vote. Again, the similarity between Coffee's
decision rule and the hypothetical bargaining approach is apparent.
Thus, my basic problem with the analytical framework that Profes-
sor Coffee presents in Part III of his article is that it does not attempt to
resolve the policymaker's dilemma, which makes generalized rules that
displace transaction-specific inquiries wholly inappropriate in the cor-
porate setting.27 Further, despite the wording of his proposed legal
standard, I have serious doubts that Professor Coffee would object to
an insufficiently specific legal rule that unambiguously increased share-
holder wealth in a particular case by dramatically raising the price of
the firm's shares. Thus, he has not succeeded in solving the poli-
cymaker's dilemma or in distancing himself in any meaningful way from
those who embrace a hypothetical bargaining approach.
III. THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES AND
INTERNAL CORPORATE LAw RULES
The judiciary's central role in corporate law arises from the exis-
tence of the policymaker's dilemma, which renders legislative enact-
ments unhelpful in a wide variety of contexts. As Professor Coffee
points out, an additional reason for support of a broad judicial role is
that internal rules of corporate governance, as well as statutes that pur-
port to govern corporations, can be privately motivated, and serve the
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. This is particularly odd in light of the fact that Professor Coffee himself appears
to recognize the existence of the policymaker's dilemma, at least in certain contexts. For
example, his discussion of poison pills makes it clear that these devices may be used
"either to maximize shareholder wealth or to entrench existing management." Id. at
1653. The inability to make thisdistinction is the core of the policymaker's dilemma.
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narrow goals of special interests such as incumbent management. 28 As
Coffee suggests, the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty are intended to
provide the judiciary with a mechanism for dealing with this problem. 29
Courts can strike down transactions that fit the letter of the law by de-
claring them to be breaches of management's fiduciary duties.3 0
Having courts apply a public-regarding interpretation of corporate
law rules provides an independent justification for an active judicial
role in the realm of corporate governance. In this regard, Professor
Coffee compares my work to Judge Easterbrook's and points out what
he believes to be a tension 3' between my view that corporate law ought
to be exclusively contractual32 and my view that statutory construction
should start with the premise that legislation should be construed by
courts as though it is public regarding.33 But there is no such tension:
just as courts can and should construe statutes so that they advance the
public interest, so too should courts interpret intracorporate rules so
that they further shareholder welfare.34 Legislation should be treated
as though the enacting legislature were acting in a public-regarding
fashion, and courts should employ an ex ante perspective to evaluate
corporate transactions as though the corporation initially had agreed to
act to maximize shareholder wealth absent clear evidence of a contrary
intention on the part of all the relevant parties. 35 An active judicial role
28. See id. at 1683-85.
29. Id.
30. An additional justification for an active judicial role has been noted by Profes-
sor Roberta Romano. Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation
Puzzle, I J.L. Econ. & Organization 225, 280 (1985). She observes that a major asset of
the state of Delaware is the experience and expertise of its judiciary in the area of corpo-
rate law. Id. The existence of a group ofjudges with competence in matters of corpo-
rate governance contributes to Delaware's attractiveness as a situs of incorporation.
Romano's point dovetails nicely with Coffee's. The greater the experience and expertise
of the court, the greater the value of its ability to interact with legislatures and boards of
directors in the ways Coffee describes.
31. Id. at 1684.
32. See, e.g., Haddock, Macey & McChesney, Property Rights in Assets and Resis-
tance to Tender Offers, 73 Va. L. Rev. 701 (1987); Macey, From Fairness to Contract:
The New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading, 13 Hofstra L. Rev. 9 (1984);
Macey & McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail, 95 Yale L. 13
(1985).
1 33. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpreta-
tion: An Interest Group Model, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 223 (1986).
34. In the corporate context, "public regarding" is synonymous with "shareholder
regarding."
35. By this I do not mean to suggest that I am equally distrustful of the legislature
in all contexts. Where there is a real measure of competition among jurisdictions, as in
the case of corporate charters, there is a far greater likelihood that lawmakers will pro-
mulgate welfare-enhancing legal rules. See Macey & Miller, supra note 23. But the
presence of some degree of competition still does not ensure that public-regarding legis-
lation will dominate. Cf. Macey, State Anti-Takeover Legislation and the National Econ-
omy, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 467 (arguing that state antitakeover legislation is welfare
reducing both for corporate shareholders and for the economy in general).
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in the interpretation of corporate law rules, following the path that I
have proposed for courts to follow with regard to statutes generally, is
thus desirable.3 6
CONCLUSION
In sum, I agree fully with Professor Coffee that the judiciary has an
36. Before one wholeheartedly embraces an active judicial role in corporate gov-
ernance, one should observe that all of the analysis thus far (both from Coffee and from
me) has focused exclusively on the benefits to shareholders and society of encouraging an
active judicial role in corporate governance. The analysis ignores the costs associated
with the intense judicial involvement in corporate life implied by both the hypothetical
bargainers and those who favor mandatory rules. But see Fischel & Bradley, The Role
of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empiri-
cal Analysis, 71 Cornell L. Rev. 261 (1986) (arguing that derivative law suits, the princi-
pal means by which courts enforce legal rules that protect shareholders against
directors' misfeasance, may not advance shareholder welfare).
Unfortunately, many of the costs associated with a litigation-centered corporate
governance system are difficult to quantify. For example, officers and directors who fear
litigation will refrain from engaging in certain wealth-makimizing transactions because
most of the benefits of such transactions will inure to the shareholders, while the costs of
any errors in the decision-making process will be disproportionately borne by the direc-
tors and officers who must defend their decisions in court. In addition to making man-
agers more risk averse, the current system also changes the decision-making process
within the firm. Instead of focusing exclusively on shareholder wealth maximization,
corporate planning is now done with an eye on future litigation. See Macey & Miller,
Trans Union Reconsidered, 98 Yale LJ. 127, 134-35 (1989). In addition, judicial and
legislative tinkering impedes the ability of market forces to constrain managerial misbe-
havior, and, in the final analysis, merely substitutes the decisions of one set of agents
(the courts) for another (the corporation's board of directors). Dooley & Veasey, The
Role of the Board in Derivative Litigation: Delaware Law and the Current ALI Propos-
als Compared, 44 Bus. Law. 503, 519-22 (1989). Finally, the chronic divergence of
interests between plaintiff-shareholders, who are generally motivated by the prospect of
attorneys' fees, and nonplaintiff-shareholders, who bear the costs of the litigation but
enjoy only a fraction of the benefits, greatly exacerbates the problems of America's liti-
gation-oriented corporate governance system.
Judges are now at the center of the American system of corporate governance.
Whether we describe their activities as enforcing mandatory fiduciary duties or as con-
struing hypothetical ex ante bargains is really a minor point in the context of this larger
reality. The important question is whether the benefits of this peculiarly American sys-
tem outweigh the costs. Coffee's article is a powerful illustration of the fact that there is
virtually no debate on this question from one quarter: all the lawyers agree that a litiga-
tion-intensive system is desirable. In light of the seemingly insatiable demand that the
current system creates for the services of corporate lawyers, one wonders whether we
lawyers really are the most qualified to address this question. And, the desirability of a
judicio-centric system of corporate governance becomes even more questionable when
one looks to countries, such asJapan, wherejudicial intervention into matters of internal
corporate governance is virtually unheard of, see generally Ramseyer, The Costs of the
Consensual Myth: Antitrust Enforcement and Institutional Barriers to Litigation in Ja-
pan, 94 Yale LJ. 604, 604 (1985) ("there are indeed few lawyers and lawsuits in Japan');
Lieberman, Confucius's Lesson to Litigants, N.Y. Times, July 9, 1984, at 19, col. 1
(describing mediation as dominant method of dispute resolution); Land Without Law-
yers, Time, Aug. 1, 1983, at 64 (describing limited role ofJapanese lawyers).
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important, albeit frequently misunderstood, role to play in corporate
governance. As Professor Coffee points out, this role has a dramatic
effect on both the contractarian and the anticontractarian visions of
corporate law. My view, however, is that the judiciary's role serves to
validate the hypothetical bargaining approach of the contractarians be-
cause an active judiciary of disinterested experts in corporate law, such
as the Delaware Supreme Court, fills in missing terms from standard-
ized corporate contracts by interpreting those contracts so as to maxi-
mize shareholder wealth. Indeed, it seems to me that recognition of
the validity of the hypothetical bargaining approach is an essential,
though unrecognized, condition for acceptance of Professor Coffee's
own arguments.
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